How Tolerant are Legislators and Citizens of Corruption? Descriptive and Experimental Evidence from Three Countries

Matteo F. Ferroni[*]
Raymond Fisman[†]
Miriam Golden[‡]

November 23, 2023

Abstract: We conduct parallel surveys of legislators and citizens in three countries to understand tolerance of corruption. In Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan, legislator and citizen respondents share similar views, based on responses to hypothetical scenarios that involve trade-offs between, for example, probity and efficiency: both groups perceive corruption as prevalent and as undesirable. These novel descriptive data further reveal that political elites generally have accurate beliefs about public opinion on corruption and appreciate its policy-relevance (despite the failure of legislators to follow through on a behavioral prompt to exhibit anti-corruption policy leadership). An information treatment updates the beliefs of legislators who overestimate citizens' anti-corruption preferences and produces adjustments. Overall, results suggest that barriers to effective anti-corruption policies do not lie with lack of information by legislators. We also present descriptive findings that show that tolerance of corruption is predicted by some politician attributes, most notably motivations for entering politics.

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[*]Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Boston University (`mferroni@bu.edu`; `@matteoferroni93`)

[†]Slater Family Professor in Behavioral Economics, Boston University (`rfisman@bu.edu`; `@RFisman`)

[‡]Peter Mair Chair of Comparative Politics, European University Institute (`miriam.golden@eui.eu`; `@mgoldenProf`)

1   Introduction

While it is well known that voters across the democratic world dislike it when elected representatives engage in corrupt behavior, much less is known about how politicians themselves perceive and judge corruption. In this paper, we report original data that we collected in three countries using parallel surveys of voters and legislators. Our central goal is to compare the views of politicians and citizens within each country, although the surveys likewise permit cross-country comparisons. We also experimentally manipulate showing legislators information we collected on citizens' views of corruption to assess whether this affects the degree of tolerance politicians express of corruption and realigns their views with those of voters. Finally, we include an experimental treatment to study whether respondents with higher tolerance of corruption are also more likely to engage in a trivial lie.

Our work builds on multiple strands of literature. First, we draw on studies of public opinion that suggest that there is wide variation in the incidence and visibility of corruption in countries around the world, but that when it occurs and they learn about it, citizens dislike corruption and blame politicians. Second, our study was inspired by recent work that documents that politicians tend to misperceive voter preferences (Butler and Dynes, 2016; Broockman and Skovon, 2018; Walgrave et al., 2023) and by related research that tries to correct misperceptions with information provision (Hjort et al., 2021; Kalla and Porter, 2021; Jalland, Roth and Wohlfart, 2023). The relevance of this literature for the study of corruption is that we expect that politicians underestimate how much corruption voters perceive and thus undervalue its policy relevance.

To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to conduct parallel surveys of politicians and voters on issues related to corruption. There are many parallel studies on other topics, particularly foreign affairs (Kertzer, 2020).

We study voters and elected legislators in three countries: Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan. The selection of countries was designed to maximize variation in per capita GDP and geography among the world's representative democracies. According to the World Bank, in 2022 Pakistan's GDP per capita was USD 1,597; Colombia's was USD 6,630; and Italy's USD 34,158. Pakistan is classified by the World

Bank as a lower-middle income country; Colombia as an upper-middle income country; and Italy as a high income country. The specific choice of these initial three countries was based on linguistic convenience and access.

The main findings that we report are based on analyses of the descriptive data we collected. Legislators and voters within and across countries share similar views on how common corruption is and how common they wish it were. Across all three countries, subjects perceive a lot of corruption and think there should be far less of it. This is true for legislators as well as voters, implying that anti-corruption policies do not fail because politicians misperceive the views of their constituents. Most politicians state that they are even willing to renounce outside income while holding a legislative seat which, while not necessarily illegal, represents a clear distraction from the duties of public office and is strongly opposed by voters. On matters of anti-corruption enforcement, voters and politicians express very different views. Voters tend to believe that politicians are likely to get away with accepting bribes, for instance, and voters believe that politicians are far more tolerant of corruption than politicians themselves report. Instead, politicians exhibit specific sensitivity to the risks of engaging in bribe-taking and express fear of exposure. On this particular topic, legislators express views that are more similar to those of legislators in other countries than they are to their own voters.

We also report results of two experimental manipulations of legislators, the first informational and the second behavioral. Neither produce the results we anticipated. We had hoped that by providing legislators accurate and visually compelling information about how much more voters dislike corruption, we could realign politicians' underlying beliefs about corruption with those of voters. These manipulations thus rested on the incorrect premise that politicians perceive less corruption and are more tolerant of it than voters. The descriptive data that we collect shows instead that voters and politicians are almost indistinguishable, on average, in the degree of corruption they perceive and in the extent to which they are willing to tolerate corruption. Overall, neither group approves of corrupt behavior but both expects it to be commonplace.

It is possible, of course, that the survey responses by politicians reflect social desirability bias; that is, that legislators provide answers that they know are broadly shared by public opinion. Our data reveals

clear evidence that, at least in Colombia and Pakistan, politicians feel free to express views in answer to other questions that are the opposite of those that would be classed as socially desirable — for example, they freely report ego- and self-interested motivations for seeking public office. Intriguingly, we find that politicians who initially overestimate the importance of corruption to voters update their beliefs downward when given accurate information about voters' views; we do not find, however, that politicians who initially underestimate voters' concern for corruption adjust their beliefs in response to treatment. Politicians who underestimate how much voters care about corruption are resistant to realigning their views with those of voters, suggesting that they discount public opinion in this realm. Thus, we find mixed evidence of social desirability bias among politicians.

Overall, our results thus show that corruption is a shared dilemma for voters and politicians. Although both groups perceive as highly common in all three countries we study, corruption represents a second-best world for legislators and voters, one that generally does not align with their values or what they think is best for society. We comment on some implications of these findings in our concluding section.

2 Survey Design and Implementation

Our core survey (reproduced as Appendix L) consists of nine parts. After seeking informed consent, we tell subjects that we will donate a substantial sum of money (the PPP equivalent of 1,000 Euros) to a non-partisan charity they choose from a list of three (varying by country) if they win a lottery after completing the survey. Section 3 consists of background questions, including partisanship; Section 4 presents five vignettes capturing tolerance and expectation for corruption when posed as a trade-off with another value (such as efficiency); Section 5 is comprised of standard questions measuring preferences for redistribution; Section 6 includes questions about perceptions of corruption and of first- and second-order beliefs about whether corrupt behavior of politicians would be exposed, charged, and convicted; and Section 7, trust questions. In Section 8, we ask subjects for open-ended feedback about the survey as well as whether they think the survey was biased. In Section 8, we randomize a

treatment asking subjects if they wish to receive a framed certificate if they win the lottery that was introduced in Section 2. The randomization consists of a control condition, in which we state that we will cover the cost (equivalent to 60 Euros) of producing and shipping the certificate; T1, which states that we will deduct the cost from the 1,000 Euro winnings and the certificate will reflect this in the donation amount; and T2, which states that we will deduct the 60 Euro cost from the 1,000 Euro winnings but that the certificate will state the winner made a donation of 1,000 Euro (hence examining whether the subject is willing to engage in a small lie in order to have the certificate).

The survey that we circulate to legislators is identical to the one sent to citizens with two additions. First, we add a section in which we ask politicians about their motivations for entering public office. Second, at the end of the survey we randomize an information treatment, which shows legislators pictograms of how their answers to the five vignette questions compare to the average answers of voters in their country. We then ask legislators a series of questions to see how they interpret the differences between their views and those of the average voter. Finally, we ask legislators to pledge to credit-claim on social media (control) or to post support for legislation that strengthens financial disclosures by elected officials (treatment) and we follow up on those who state they will post by examining whether they do. In Figure 1, we present summary diagrams that show the various components of the two surveys.

In 2021, we pretested the survey on 80 undergraduate students at the University of Oxford via the Nuffield Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS). We then began rolling out a slightly modified survey in 2022; data collection continues in 2023. In Table 1, we report basic descriptive features of the various surveys (excluding pre-tests).

Readers will observe that we use diverse methods to contact potential respondents depending on local circumstances. These range from email and phone calls to in-person approaches. For phone calls and direct approaches, we use either undergraduate students (Colombia and Italy) or trained local enumerators (Pakistan) whom we hire so that contacts are made in the respondent's native language.

Figure 1: Survey components

3 Descriptive Results

3.1 Tolerance of Corruption

We begin by describing the vignettes and how citizens and legislators respond to them in the surveys. Given their importance to our analysis, we show the first two vignettes in fulls in Figure 2.

Each vignette asks respondents to make a choice based on a trade-off between probity and another value, such as efficiency (Vignette 1), strict law enforcement (Vignette 2), the competitiveness of a democratic election (Vignette 3), family ties (Vignette 4), or redistribution (Vignette 5). There is (we hope) no obvious "right" answer to any of these questions; perhaps it would be preferable to overlook some corruption to get public goods constructed more quickly, for instance. The vignettes were designed to elicit whether subjects were prepared to endorse some corruption to achieve some other socially desirable goal.

Table 1: **Descriptive information about surveys of citizens and legislators**

Country/province	Subjects	Mode(s)	Number in pool	Response number	Response rate	Dates
Colombia	citizens	online	NA	1,000	NA	Mar 2023
Italy	citizens	online	NA	1,998	NA	Nov 2021
Pakistan, KPK	citizens	online, in person	NA	1,484	NA	Nov–Dec 2021
Pakistan, Punjab	citizens	online, in person	NA	500	NA	Dec 2022
Colombia	Senators	in person	108	7	6%	IP
Colombia	Representatives	in person	188	23	12%	IP
Italy	Senators	email	461	11	2%	Jun 2022–Apr 2023
Italy	Deputies	email	863	22	3%	Jun 2022–Apr 2023
Italy	Regional legislators	email, phone	917	84	9%	Jun 2022–Apr 2023
Pakistan	KPK MPAs	in person	145	116	80%	Jun–Nov 2022
Pakistan	Punjab MPAs	in person	371	175	55%	Jan–Feb 2023

Notes: NA = not applicable. IP = in progress. KPK = Khyber Pahktunhkwa. MPAs = Members of the Provincial Assembly. Vendors for citizens surveys: Colombia, Netquest; Italy, Lucid; Pakistan, Direct Focus Community Aid (DFCA). Surveys were circulated in Spanish in Colombia; in Italian in Italy; and in English and Urdu in Pakistan. Citizens were selected to be representative by age, gender, income, and macro-region in Colombia and Italy and rural/urban in KPK. The entire Punjab citizens' sample was collected in the province's capital, Lahore. In Italy, we surveyed Senators and Deputies elected in 2018 (to the XVIII legislature) and also in 2022 (to the XIX legislature), because the latter elections occurred while our survey was underway. Except for in-person citizen surveys in KPK, which were filled out on paper and subsequently input, all survey responses were collected electronically into Qualtrics.

Figure 2: Sample vignettes

An official of the PPRA (Public Procurement Regulatory Authority) is in charge of overseeing a highway contract. Two companies have made comparable bids. **Company A** is known to be scrupulously honest. **Company B** is rumored to have bribed officials in the past to get contracts but is very efficient in its business. It is expected that Company B will complete the road much more quickly than Company A, without any sacrifice in quality.

Which company do you think the official **should** select?

| Company A | Company B |

Which company do you think the official **would** select if this were to occur in Pakistan?

| Company A | Company B |

(1.a) First vignette

A Member of the National Assembly discovers that his personal assistant was given a holiday gift of expensive Eid sweets by a businessman who had been trying to set up a meeting with the politician. After receiving the gift, the assistant set up a meeting for the following week, whereas it would normally have taken longer to make an appointment with the representative. Although not explicitly illegal, some people could see this as favoritism.

What do you think the legislator **should** do?

| Nothing | Warn his assistant | Write up his assistant | Fire his assistant |

What do you think the legislator **would** do if this were to occur in Pakistan?

| Nothing | Warn his assistant | Write up his assistant | Fire his assistant |

(1.b) Second vignette

In Figure 3, we show how respondents answered to the vignette questions about what subjects expect ("what would happen?") by country and type of respondent (citizens and politicians). These capture what we label *corruption expectations*. By very large majorities, citizens think that the corrupt policy option would be selected in each scenario if it were to transpire in their country. While a smaller fraction of Italians think the corrupt option would be chosen relative to the other two countries, even

there a vast majority think the corrupt option would be selected.

Figure 3: Vignette responses: proportions of respondents who expect the corrupt outcome (what "would" happen if . . .)


Notes: The left sub-figure shows the results for the Colombian sample; the central sub-figure shows the results for the Italian sample; the right sub-figure shows the results for the Pakistani sample. Each sub-figure depicts the share of respondents that satisfy the condition listed on the left vertical axis with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

The data show that politicians are almost as likely as citizens to believe that the corrupt option will be selected. Indeed, in a few cases, they are even more likely. The largest gaps between what politicians and citizens expect is in Italy, where voters are considerably more likely than politicians to believe the corrupt option will be selected. But even in Italy, many politicians believe that corruption would occur were the scenarios to transpire that are described in the vignettes. Indeed, the extent of agreement between voters and their elected representatives in all three countries is striking. It is also notable how little difference there is across the three countries.

The data displayed in Figure 3 is corroborated by the data reported in Figure 4, which shows how corrupt citizens and politicians believe their country to be. More than 80 percent of both citizens and legislators in all three countries believe that corruption is either "common" or "extremely common." Majorities of voters in all three countries also believe that it is likely that a politician would accept a bribe if offered one. In Colombia and Pakistan, responses by politicians to this question are indis-

Figure 4: Respondent perceptions of corruption, bribe-taking, and tolerance of outside income by politicians

% of respondents who...

Notes: The figure depicts, by country, the share of respondents that satisfy the condition listed on the left vertical axis with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

tinguishable from those of voters. Politicians in Italy are less likely than Italian voters to believe that a politician would accept a bribe; we ascribe this to the lag in corruption perceptions on the part of Italian voters, who appear to fail to appreciate the extent to which political corruption has become substantially less frequent since the Clean Hands investigations of the mid-1990s (see (Fisman and Golden, 2017, ch. 8)). Finally, we report responses to a question asking whether subjects think that politicians should be allowed to earn income from outside consulting even while serving in public office. Voters are overwhelmingly opposed to this, and they are joined in their views by Pakistani politicians. Larger proportions of politicians in Colombia and Italy express acceptance of outside income, but even in the latter two countries, a majority of legislators oppose allowing elected officials to earn income on the side. These results corroborate data reported above showing that elected officials oppose corruption; this is apparently the case even if it entails restricting their own outside earning ability.

Figure 5: Respondent beliefs about likelihood that bribe-taking politician would be exposed, charged, and convicted

Notes: The figure depicts, by country, the share of respondents that satisfy the condition listed on the left vertical axis with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

Voters not only think they are surrounded by corruption, they distrust the judiciary to do anything about it. In Figure 5, we report how likely respondents believe it is that a politician who took a bribe would be exposed in public, charged with a crime, and then convicted. Well over half of voters believe that it is unlikely, very unlikely, or not likely at all that a bribe-taking politician would be exposed for wrongdoing, charged, or convicted; the only exception is in Pakistan, where most voters believe that a bribe-taking politician would not be exposed and charged but that if he were, he would go on to be convicted. This may reflect events in the country that took place just prior to the survey period, when a small number of very prominent politicians were convicted of corruption. Overall, voters in all three countries are highly skeptical of legal enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and of the media's ability to expose this kind of political malfeasance.

In all three countries, much larger proportions of politicians than voters believe that a bribe-taker would be exposed, charged, and convicted. The data thus suggest that politicians as a group are

highly sensitive to the public and judicial risks of engaging in illicit behavior. With the exception of Colombian legislators — only about 30 percent of whom believe they would be convicted if exposed and charged with bribe-taking — more than 60 percent of legislators believe that if they took a bribe, they would be exposed, charged, and convicted. Assuming these reported beliefs are sincere, it seems that most legislators would hesitate to accept a bribe in these countries since doing so presents professional and personal risks of which legislators are well aware.[1]

Do citizens and politicians find acceptable the high degree of corruption they perceive in their country? In Figure 7, we show the distribution of responses to the vignette questions about what subjects think ought to occur ("what should happen?"). These questions measure what we call *corruption tolerance*. We see that — with one exception on which we comment shortly — both politicians and citizens generally favor the non-corrupt choice in the hypothetical scenarios. Fewer than a quarter of respondents endorse allowing an efficient but corrupt company to be awarded a construction contract (Vignette 1); and upwards of 80 percent of respondents support hiring an experienced candidate over a relative (Vignette 4). More than half of respondents in every case also support strict enforcement of campaign finance laws (Vignette 3) even when doing so erects an obstacle to a level playing field in democratic electoral competition. The consistent exception occurs in response to Vignette 2, for which majorities of both legislators and voters say they believe that a politician's assistant should be free to accept a small gift in exchange for allowing someone to jump the queue to meet with a politician.

On two questions in Figure 7, we see relatively large discrepancies between the responses of Pakistani citizens and legislators. Pakistani legislators are considerably more tolerant of a wealthy and socially-minded political candidate even if he is known to be corrupt (Vignette 5); conversely, more of them prefer strict enforcement of campaign finance laws than voters (Vignette 3).

Overall, responses depicted in Figure 7 reveal that politicians and voters express values that are more

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[1]If legislators express the view that they would be exposed, indicted, and convicted for accepting a bribe yet also believe corruption to be commonplace in their country, it means that either they define corruption more broadly than mere bribe-taking and/or they suspect others of frequent bribe-taking.

Figure 6: Vignette responses: proportions of respondents who endorse the corrupt outcome (what "should" happen if ...)


Notes: The left sub-figure shows the results for the Colombian sample; the central sub-figure shows the results for the Italian sample; the right sub-figure shows the results for the Pakistani sample. Each sub-figure depicts the share of respondents that satisfy the condition listed on the left vertical axis with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

similar than different. In particular, we do not observe that politicians are more tolerant of corruption than voters. This contrasts sharply with voters' perceptions which, as we saw in Figure 3, are that politicians generally would be likely to engage in corruption under various scenarios.

To explore the characteristics of citizens and politicians who are more tolerant of corruption, we create two standardized indices based on responses to all five vignettes. We follow guidelines provided by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) to construct the indices. The first index is based on responses to questions about what subjects think *would* happen in their country under each hypothetical scenario. The second index is based on responses to questions about what subjects think *should* happen under each hypothetical scenario. In what follows, we refer to the former as the *index of corruption expectations* and latter as the *index of corruption tolerance*. Higher standardized values indicate higher perceptions or greater tolerance of corruption, although the values themselves are not meaningful. Based on self-reported responses to questions about their electoral behavior, we then divide voters according to their partisan orientations or affiliations. In Colombia, we class parties as leftwing or

11

Figure 7: Vignette responses: what "would" and "should" happen by party affiliation

rightwing; in Italy, as leftwing, rightwing, or populist (the Movimento Cinque Stelle [5SM], or Five Star Movement); and in Pakistan as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) or other. The PTI was elected into national office in 2018 on a populist and strongly anti-corruption platform, not entirely unlike that of Italy's M5S. In Figure 7, we depict the (non-causal) association between where legislators and voters in each country appear on the two indices and their reported partisan preference or affiliation.

The data in the figure shows that in most cases, there is no statistically significant difference between partisan supporters in their views of corruption; that is, we cannot distinguish Colombian leftwing from rightwing voters or Colombian leftwing from rightwing politicians by how likely they think a corrupt policy decision would be made or according to their tolerance of corruption. Similarly, we cannot distinguish Italian leftwing from M5S supporters or Italian leftwing from rightwing legislators; nor, finally, can we distinguish Pakistani PTI legislators from legislators elected into other political parties. Heterogeneous partisan effects on both what respondents expect and think should happen

are visible only for Pakistani voters. Perhaps unexpectedly, PTI supporters express both greater perceptions and greater tolerance of corruption. We show in Table B.1 that this effect is driven heavily by rural respondents. Italian rightwing voters also stand out; they express distinctly lower corruption expectations than leftwing voters or supporters of the Five Star Movement. Not only do Italian rightwing voters think corrupt choices would occur less often, the data displayed in the bottom half of the figure also show that rightwing voters are significantly more likely than leftwing to express tolerance of corruption.

The general pattern of these results is consistent with the view that corruption is a valence issue; voters and legislators do not perceive more or less corruption according to their partisan location on the political spectrum nor do they express significantly different values about it. Even in Pakistan, where the then-governing PTI campaigned heavily on an anti-corruption platform, legislators across all parties share similar views of whether corrupt policy choices would occur or should take place. PTI voters, by contrast, exhibit apparently contradictory views about the commonness and acceptability of corruption; for more information, see Table B.1. In Italy, M5S legislators believe corruption more likely to occur than other legislators and also express significantly less tolerance of corruption than rightwing legislators (although their views overlap with those of leftwing legislators). For more details, see Table B.1.

To explore more fully whether anti-corruption views are shared across the political spectrum, in Figure 8 we compare responses using the same two indices just discussed to an index of support for redistribution, created out of responses to three questions about the topic. Views about redistribution are commonly taken as representing the basis of the left-right spectrum in politics. The figure shows large and significant differences been more and less pro-redistributive citizens in their views about whether corruption would or should occur. Voters with above average preferences for redistribution think corrupt policy choices would more often occur than voters with below average redistributive preferences; in addition, perhaps as we might expect, pro-redistributive voters express less tolerance of corruption. The data show that voters have substantively different views of corruption, views that align well with their preferences for redistribution; as we saw in Figure 7, these differences are not

Figure 8: Vignette responses: what "would" and "should" happen by preferences for redistribution

Notes: The left sub-figure shows the results for the citizens sample; the right sub-figure shows the results for the legislators sample. Each sub-figure depicts, by country, the average value of the Corruption Expectation Index (top three rows) and the average value of the Corruption Tolerance Index (bottom three rows) by preferences for redistribution. *Above Mean Redistribution* is defined as being above the mean of a Z-Score index built using the preference for redistribution questions; *Below Mean Redistribution* is defined as being below the mean of the same Z-Score index.

captured by partisan orientations. Thus, parties appear successful in converting corruption into a valence issue rather than allowing any single party to weaponize it electorally — even though voters' anti-corruption views align with the fundamentals of the left-right spectrum.

Turning to legislators, results are somewhat different. Legislators with above and below average preferences for redistribution express different expectations of corruption in Colombia and Pakistan, but not Italy. As for tolerance of corruption, only in Pakistan do we see significant differences between more and less pro-redistributive legislators. It is possible that the failure of redistributive preferences to distinguish expectations and tolerance of corruption is driven in part by small sample sizes (especially in Colombia); for Italy, we suspect redistributive preferences may be less fundamental for political alignments across parties due to the emergence of the Five Star Movement.

3.2 Trust in Others and in Politicians

Do voters hold politicians responsible for the vast amount of corruption that they believe surrounds them? To study this, we examine answers to a question about whether politicians can be trusted. We calibrate answers against those to two country-specific baseline trust questions regarding "most people." In Figure 9, we depict answers for citizens and politicians by country.

Figure 9: Responses to trust questions

Notes: The figure depicts, by country, the share of respondents that satisfy the condition listed on the left vertical axis with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

The data show that generally, citizens are less trusting than politicians, except in Pakistan, where citizens express high rates of trust in others. These result are the reverse of those regarding trust in politicians: low proportions of voters (under 25 percent) believe politicians can be trusted whereas politicians are much more likely to trust each other. Overall, voters trust each other more than their elected representatives. The higher rates of trust that legislators express towards each other suggest that in all three countries, legislators work in political environments that permit negotiations and deal-making. That politicians trust each other more than voters trust politicians provides a whiff of the "corrupt elite" phenomenon that fuels populist politics around the world. Voters in all three countries appear suspicious of legislators and exhibit little faith that they would do the right thing when facing

difficult political decisions.

3.3   Motivations for Entering Public Office and Tolerance of Corruption

We turn now to the motivations politicians identify for their decisions to seek public office, and in particular to whether some types of motivations are associated with more tolerance of corruption. The survey provides legislators six possible motivations for entering public office and asks them to report how important each motivation is. We combine the six into sets of two, reflecting private interest ("the salary" and "career opportunities or pension after holding office"), ego motivations ("to get the admiration of others" and "less appealing opportunities in the private sector"), and social motivations ("to work on public policy and legislation" and "to help those in need or serve others in my community"). In Figure 10, we break legislators in each country into those with below and above average tolerance of corruption (using the corruption tolerance index discussed above) and report the share that found at least one in each set to be "important" or "very important."

Figure 10: Share of legislators' reporting at least one of two motivations for entering public office and tolerance of corruption

Notes: The figure depicts, by country and by being below of above the mean of the Corruption Tolerance Index, the share of respondents that report as important or very important at least one of the two motivations for entering public office within each category. *Private Interest* motivations are: career opportunities and salary; *Ego Interest* motivations are: admiration from others and better than private; *Social Interest* motivations are: work on public policy and help those in need.

16

Regardless of their tolerance of corruption, all politicians report they consider at least one social motivation to be an important or very important reason for entering office. In Italy, politicians exclusively report social motivations for seeking public office. This may reflect their sensitivity to what they perceive as public opinion even in an anonymous survey. Colombian and especially Pakistani politicians are more open than Italian legislators about ego and personal interest motivations. In Colombia (where at present we have a relatively small number of survey respondents) and in Pakistan, we see clear differences between above- and below-average corruption-tolerant politicians. In both countries, politicians with above-average tolerance of corruption are more likely to report ego and private interest motivations for seeking public office than politicians with below-average tolerance. This suggests that encouraging the right type of person to seek public office — someone driven more by social rather than ego or private interest motivations — could possibly improve public policy (Gulzar and Khan, 2023). However, the data also show that most people who enter legislative office do so thanks to a mix of motivations, both self- and other-regarding, making it difficult to identify individuals genuinely committed to social concerns. (For details on the proportions of legislators in each country who said each of the six motivations was important or very important, see Figure B.1.)

4 Experimental Results

The survey contained a single experimental manipulation of all respondents and an additional information treatment aimed exclusively at legislators. We present results of both. We also present results of a behavioral prompt directed at legislators.

4.1 The Certificate Experiment

We ask all respondents if they wish to receive a framed certificate should they win the lottery that makes a substantial donation on their behalf to a charity of their choice. We randomly separate respondents into three groups. The groups consist of a control condition, in which we state that we

will cover the cost (equivalent to 60 Euros) of producing and shipping the certificate; T1, which states that we will deduct the cost from the 1,000 Euro (calibrated to each country's currency and purchasing power parity) winnings and that the certificate will thus report a 9,400 donation; and T2, which states that we will deduct the 60 Euro cost from the 1,000 Euro donation but that the certificate will state the winner made a donation of 1,000 Euro. The control condition serves as a baseline; T1 measures whether respondents are willing to waste a small amount of money to receive the certificate; and T2 whether they are willing to engage in a small lie in order to receive the certificate. In Figure 11, we depict proportions of voters and legislators by country in each condition who want the certificate even if it means wasting (T1) or lying (T2).

Figure 11: Proportions of respondents wanting a certificate and willing to waste or lie to obtain one

Notes: The figure depicts, by country and by treatment arm, the share of respondents wanting the certificate with its associated 90% confidence interval, for citizens and legislator in the sample.

In all three countries, far more voters than legislators express interest in receiving a certificate. This is directly contrary to our expectations; indeed, we designed the experiment with the thought that legislators would find a framed certificate reporting a substantial charitable donation to be electorally valuable. Results show instead that legislators are largely indifferent; presumably, they have many opportunities to receive public expressions of thanks and do not need yet another framed piece of paper.

Voters, by contrast, are often eager to receive a certificate and usually do not mind if obtaining one generates waste or involves a lie. Thus, we find no significant treatment effects for either legislators or citizens in Colombia or Italy; in Pakistan, voters display sensitivity to both waste or to lying and legislators display acute sensitivity to lying.

To unpack these results more fully, in Table 2 we study heterogeneous treatment effects for low- and high-corruption-tolerant subjects, using the same index of corruption tolerance as above. The table reports multivariate regression results for above- and below-average corruption-tolerant legislators and voters by country. As the data in Panel A shows, in all three countries, respondents who are more tolerant of corruption are also more likely to want the certificate, with the exception of Colombian legislators. This is generally true even though treatment effects are statistically significant almost exclusively in Pakistan.

In Table 3, we present auxiliary analyses showing that all else equal, men are generally more likely than women to ask for a certificate, as are younger, low income, and less well educated respondents. In Pakistan, the only country where we have information that allows us to separate our sample of citizens into rural and urban, rural residents are much more likely to want a certificate, all else equal. Results in the table confirm what we have already seen in Figure 11: in every case, legislators are significantly less likely to want a certificate than voters and Colombians significantly more likely to want one than Pakistanis or Italians.

4.2   The Information Treatment of Legislators

We have already seen that a majority of respondents in all three countries anticipate that government officials would select the corrupt option in each vignette. Our information treatment shows each treated legislator how his answer to each vignette question compares to answers by citizens in his country. In Figure 12, we provide an example (from Pakistan, where the survey was available in English) of how we present the information to treated legislators.

In the pictograph, the primary information that is conveyed is that citizens expect politicians to make

Figure 12: Sample treatment infograph

The following figure compares the answers that you provided in response to the various scenarios that we presented to you a few minutes ago to those provided by a random sample of adults in Pakistan. The bars show the distribution of responses about what people expect politicians <u>would do</u> in each scenario and the little figure shows what you thought the official <u>should do</u>.

As you can see, **in 2 scenarios out of 5,** a majority of voters think that public officials will make decisions that are different from what you believed to be appropriate.

What citizens think public officials would do

corrupt decisions under various scenarios. We see this by the fact that the darker shaded bars, indicating the percentage of citizens who thought legislators would choose the corrupt option, are always greater than half. (The particular legislator whose responses are depicted in Figure 12 agrees with voters in three out of five scenarios, as indicated by the position of the figure icon.) Whether this kind of treatment affects a legislator's beliefs depends on whether he already held the same view of what citizens believe or whether instead the information is new. If it is new, it potentially causes the legislator to update.

After presenting information about what voters expect politicians to do, we ask legislators five questions. In this section, we analyze the results of the post-treatment question with the clearest link to citizens' beliefs about the likely occurrence of corruption. The question we ask is: "Do you think that voters' views about how serious corruption is in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan] are accurate?" with responses on a five-point scale from "underestimate its serious a lot" to "overestimate its seriousness a lot." Responses to the question reflect a politician's beliefs about voters' beliefs (hence, second-order beliefs) about corruption's seriousness as compared to the politician's beliefs about the true level of

corruption. The treatment provides information on the true value of citizens' beliefs (holding constant, we presume, each legislator's beliefs about the extent of actual corruption). The sign (and extent) of updating for whether legislators think citizens overestimate corruption — which is the object measured in our survey — depends on the respondent's initial beliefs about this. Our main hypothesis is that legislators will update in the direction of the signal they receive about citizens' perceptions.

To assess each legislator's initial belief about what citizens believe, prior to the information treatment we ask each legislator: "Out of 10 adult citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan], how many do you think would answer [that corruption is] common or extremely common?" The lowest response we received was a 3 (out of 10) and the median response was 8; 35 percent of respondents answered 9 or 10. Thus, legislators' initial second-order beliefs were typically that citizens thought corruption was relatively common.

Directionally, we expect legislators who initially believe that citizens believe there is not much corruption to adjust their expectations upward relative to legislators with initial second-order beliefs that citizens believe corruption is common. To the extent that legislators' initial second-order estimates are too high, the information treatment will lead to a downward adjustment, and vice-versa if initial estimates are too low.

In the initial specification reported in Table 4, we present results that pool responses from legislators from all three countries. These show the overall treatment effect on legislators, independent of their initial beliefs or their country. Our outcome variable is *CitizenBias*$_l$, which captures legislator l's response on a 5-point scale of the extent to which citizens under- or overestimate corruption. The median legislator's response is that citizens hold accurate views of corruption, neither under- nor over-estimating it. The coefficient on the treatment variable, *InfoTreatment*$_l$, is -0.22 and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the information treatment reduces the degree to which legislators whose priors were that citizens overestimate the extent of corruption persist in that view. In column 2, we report results when we collapse the outcome variable into a binary measure that takes the value of 1 if a legislator believes citizens over-estimate corruption and 0 otherwise. By dichotomizing the dependent variable, we are more clearly able to interpret how the treatment affects legislator second-order beliefs

independently of the scale on which those beliefs are measured. The results reported in column 2 show that when we dichotomize the outcome, the coefficient on the treatment variable remains negative and is marginally significant ($p < 0.10$); its value, -0.09, implies a 30 percent reduction in the likelihood that a legislator believes that citizens overestimate the extent of corruption relative to the baseline of 0.30.

Our main conjecture is that legislators who initially believe that most citizens see corruption as common will adjust their beliefs downward *relative* to those who had already hold the view that citizens see corruption as less common. We thus allow for a different treatment effect for legislators whose initial beliefs (*Second Order Beliefs*) are above the median overall — that is, the 35 percent of legislators who responded in the survey that 9 or 10 out of 10 citizens believe corruption is common or very common — versus other legislators; we consider other parameterizations below. To implement this, we include the interaction terms $InfoTreatment * I(Second \leq 8)$ and $InfoTreatment * I(CitizenBeliefs > 8)$ in predicting *CitizenBias*. We report results in columns 3 and 4 for the binarized version of *CitizenBias* ; in both cases, we see that the negative treatment effect comes entirely from those with initially very high beliefs about citizens' corruption perceptions. The treatment effect for those with initially low beliefs is close to zero and statistically insignificant ($p = 0.2139$). When we use a continuous measure of initial beliefs, reported in column 3, we similarly observe that legislators with higher initial second-order beliefs adjust downward relative to those with lower initial beliefs; thus, the interaction of initial beliefs and treatment is negatively signed.

In Table C.1, we present results disaggregated by country. The patterns are similar for legislators in all three countries, though with the greatest precision — as expected given the larger sample size — for Pakistan.

Post-treatment questions in the legislator survey allow the clearest mapping from the treatment to beliefs about citizens' estimates of corruption. We also examine whether exposure to accurate and visually memorable pictograms depicting voters' corruption beliefs impacts legislators' beliefs and perceptions through their responses to four other post-treatment questions. We report the full results to the following questions in Tables C.2–C.5. The questions asked are:

22

1. whether politicians and voters hold similar views on corruption;

2. whether voters see corruption as a major concern relative to other issues;

3. whether voters' views of corruption undermine trust in government;

4. whether legislators are willing to support legislation aimed at strengthening financial disclosure laws.

The results reported in Tables C.2–C.5 are mixed. The question of whether politicians and voters hold similar views captures similar information to that of whether citizens overestimate corruption, though in a manner that makes it harder to make clear directional predictions; it depends critically on what we assume about politicians' prior beliefs. The patterns reported in Table C.2 go in the same direction as those reported in Table 4, with treatment generally shrinking the politician-citizen gap in perceptions; the treatment effect is (weakly) stronger for those who believe initially that voters see corruption as very common.

Perhaps the most striking results involve legislators' beliefs about how corruption affects trust in government, reported in Table C.4. The average treatment effect is zero. However, we observe opposite-signed effects (in the expected directions) for legislators with high versus low initial second order beliefs: the treatment reduces the belief that corruption undermines trust in government among politicians whose priors were that voters see corruption as common whereas it increases this belief for those with initially more optimistic priors. We observe no treatment effect on willingness to support financial disclosure legislation, at least in part because the vast majority of legislators already express such support. This is evident in the data reported in Table C.5, where we see that the mean in the control group is 90 percent.

The information treatment is effective in the sense of producing statistically significant results in many instances. It is ineffective in regard to our initial intentions, which was to prompt legislators to adjust their second-order beliefs upwards. This is because legislators' priors were different than we imagined when we designed the survey: legislators already believed that citizens thought corruption was common. Our new data shows that where legislators fail to enact policies that successfully rein

in corruption, it is not likely to be because they misperceive the preferences and views of voters.

4.3 Behavioral Prompt for Legislators

As a follow-up to the information treatment, we also include a behavioral prompt in the survey. We randomly divide all legislator (regardless of whether they received the information treatment) into two groups. The treated group is asked to make a public announcement (on the social media platform of their choice) of their support for legislation that strengthens financial disclosures on the part of persons running for elected office. The control group is asked to make a public announcement (again, on the social media platform of their choice) regarding some recent legislative accomplishment.

Very few legislators in either case responded that they would make such announcements. We studied the social media announcements (on whichever platform each legislator reported as using; i.e. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc.) during a week-long period after each completed the survey and captured all those posts that were potentially relevant. Manual analysis of the posts showed, however, that no legislator posted regarding a recent legislative accomplishment and that no legislator posted support for financial disclosure legislation.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, we have described the results of what we believe to be the first parallel surveys of legislators and citizens on the topic of corruption, based on data collected in Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan. We find that, to a remarkable degree, in all countries legislators and citizens share similar views on the acceptability as well as prevalence of corruption: both see corruption as common and also undesirable. We emphasize that the latter conclusion is based on responses to hypothetical scenarios that involve real policy trade-offs (e.g., between probity and efficiency), which we hope minimizes experimenter demand effects. A gap does appear, however, in respondents' second-order beliefs of legislators' tolerance of corruption versus politicians' own stated tolerance, as well as the extent

to which citizens believe politicians will be caught and punished for taking bribes. Politicians, by contrast, have accurate perceptions of citizen concern for corruption.

The patterns that emerge from our descriptive analysis thus suggest that politicians accurately perceive voters' corruption, so that correct information about the electorate's priorities are not a primary barrier to promoting government anticorruption programs. Further reinforcing this overall view, while an information treatment on citizen concerns does causally impact politicians' beliefs about citizens' concerns among those those overestimate electorates' beliefs about the pervasiveness of corruption, our intervention has no effect on stated support by politicians for anticorruption policies. What emerges is thus potentially a self-reinforcing loop of politicians failing to act on their corruption concerns and voters, on observing this lack of responsiveness, interpreting it as a lack of concern. A charitable interpretation (and we think not an unrealistic one) is that many politicians *do* see corruption as harmful, but see no easy solutions and/or no ready political coalition to pursue an anticorruption agenda (or they may simply have other priorities, partisan or otherwise), and the resultant inaction is misperceived is indifference.

We cannot, therefore, offer any anticorruption prescription – rather, if the above interpretation has some merit, it will require political entrepreneurs who can build the requisite support for reform. Encouraging voters to support such candidates may be a step in the right direction – note our results which show that motivations for entering politics is a predictor for corruption tolerance – though prior research suggests that getting voters to prioritize anticorruption is itself a challenging task.

Table 2: Treatment effects on requesting a certificate for high- and low-corruption-tolerant respondents

	Colombia		Italy		Pakistan	
	Citizens (1)	Legislators (2)	Citizens (3)	Legislators (4)	Citizens (5)	Legislators (6)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)						
Mean	0.57	0.30	0.35	0.23	0.71	0.38
Mean of high corruption-tolerant	0.60	0.00	0.40	0.28	0.88	0.53
Mean of low corruption-tolerant	0.55	0.38	0.32	0.18	0.56	0.19
Panel B: Treatment Effects - Waste VS Control						
Treatment - Waste	-0.01	-0.31	0.03	-0.08	-0.11***	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Treatment - Waste - High-tolerant	-0.00	0.11	0.03	-0.20	-0.13***	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Treatment - Waste - Low-tolerant	-0.01	-0.54*	0.02	0.00	-0.09***	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Observations	668	19	1329	77	1306	196
R^2	0.042	0.191	0.015	0.044	0.419	0.105
Panel C: Treatment Effects - Waste + Lie VS Waste						
Treatment - Waste + Lie	0.03	0.42**	-0.03	-0.07	-0.09***	-0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Treatment - Waste + Lie - High-tolerant	0.03	0.36	-0.02	0.04	-0.17***	-0.49***
	(0.06)	(0.28)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Treatment - Waste + Lie - Low-tolerant	0.04	0.35	-0.03	-0.14*	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Observations	664	20	1332	73	1324	193
R^2	0.031	0.330	0.016	0.090	0.660	0.215
Panel D: Treatment Effects - Waste + Lie VS Control						
Treatment - Waste + Lie	0.02	0.04	-0.00	-0.16**	-0.20***	-0.29***
	(0.04)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Treatment - Waste + Lie - High-tolerant	0.02	0.40	0.01	-0.17	-0.31***	-0.45***
	(0.06)	(0.32)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Treatment - Waste + Lie - Low-tolerant	0.02	-0.16	-0.01	-0.13*	-0.10***	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.38)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Observations	666	21	1335	74	1338	193
R^2	0.032	0.166	0.014	0.116	0.574	0.182

Notes: The dependent variable in every column is an indicator variables for whether the respondent requests the certificate. Regressions reported in all panels for the citizen samples include controls for gender, age group, education, and income group. Regressions reported in all panels for the legislator samples include controls for gender, age group, and education. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group ("No waste" certificate question) and separately for being below or above the mean of the Corruption Tolerance Index of their group. Panel B reports the coefficients from two different specifications. The first row shows the treatment effect of "Waste" relative to "No waste". The following two rows show the treatment effects on respondents below and above the mean of the Corruption Tolerance Index separately. Panel C reports the coefficients from two different specifications. The first row shows the treatment effect of "Waste + Lie" relative to "Waste". The following two rows show the treatment effects on respondents below and above the mean of the Corruption Tolerance Index separately. Panel D reports the coefficients from two different specifications. The first row shows the treatment effect of "Waste + Lie" relative to "No waste". The following two rows show the treatment effects on respondents below and above the mean of the Corruption Tolerance Index separately. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Factors associated with wanting a certificate

	Colombia			Italy			Pakistan			All Countries
	Citizens (1)	Legislators (2)	Full Sample (3)	Citizens (4)	Legislators (5)	Full Sample (6)	Citizens (7)	Legislators (8)	Full Sample (9)	(10)
Corruption Tolerance Index - By Country x Group	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.10)		0.03** (0.01)	0.09** (0.04)		0.10*** (0.01)	0.05* (0.03)		
Corruption Tolerance Index - By Country			0.02 (0.02)			0.03** (0.01)			0.10*** (0.01)	
Corruption Tolerance Index - Full Sample										0.07*** (0.01)
Male	0.07** (0.03)	0.11 (0.18)	0.07** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.10* (0.06)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)
Aged 35-49	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.30 (0.32)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.05** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Aged 50 or more	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.11 (0.30)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.08*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.18 (0.13)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.03* (0.02)
Medium income	0.05 (0.04)		0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)		-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)
High income	0.00 (0.05)		0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)		-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)
High School degree	0.04 (0.04)		0.04 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)		0.06* (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)		-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
College degree	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.30 (0.26)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)
Legislator			-0.19** (0.09)			-0.24*** (0.04)			-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)
Pakistan										-0.05*** (0.02)
Italy										-0.24*** (0.02)
Rural							0.71*** (0.02)			
Left-Wing Party	-0.06 (0.04)	0.15 (0.32)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.03)				
5 Stars Movement				-0.02 (0.03)	0.11 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.03)				
PTI							-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	0.18*** (0.02)	
Observations	985	30	1015	1979	112	2090	1941	291	2232	5401
R^2	0.042	0.247	0.050	0.017	0.183	0.030	0.583	0.193	0.245	0.118

Notes: The dependent variable in every column is an indicator variables for whether the respondent requests the certificate. Regressions reported in all panels include controls for gender, age group, income group, political affiliation, education, being a legislator, country fixed effects, being from rural area, and indicator variables for all treatments. Omitted categories are being female, being younger than 35 years old, having a low income, not having completed high school, being a citizen respondent, being from Colombia, being from a urban area (for Pakistan citizens), voting/being from a right-wing party (for Colombia and Italy) or not voting/not being from PTI (for Pakistan). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Information treatment effects on belief that citizens overestimate corruption

	Continuous (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)	Binary (4)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)				
All Legislators mean	2.99	0.30	0.30	0.30
Above threshold mean			0.37	
Below threshold mean			0.22	
Panel B: All Legislators				
Treatment	-0.22**	-0.09*		0.25
	(0.11)	(0.05)		(0.22)
T x More than 80% corruption as common			-0.15**	
			(0.06)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common			-0.02	
			(0.08)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common				-0.04
				(0.03)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common				0.05**
				(0.02)
Observations	340	340	340	340
R^2	0.050	0.025	0.038	0.049

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is a 5-point scale variable on the extent to which citizens under- or overestimate corruption, the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4) is an indicator variable for whether legislators believe that citizens overestimate the extent of corruption. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, education, and country fixed effects. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panel B reports the coefficients from four different specifications. The first and second column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The third column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The fourth column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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Appendices

A Sample Characteristics

In Table , we report basic characteristics of the citizen samples in each country.

B Demographic and Partisan Correlates Among Voters and Legislators of Tolerance of Corruption

In this section, we report associations for voters by country between some demographic variables (gender, age, and education) and their tolerance of corruption as well as between partisan inclinations and tolerance of corruption. We divide voters by gender, age, and education. We also divide voters into those who report having voted for or supporting a party we classify as leftwing or instead as rightwing in Colombia; leftwing, rightwing, or populist in Italy; and PTI or other in Pakistan. In Italy, we classify the Five Star Movement (*Movimento 5 Stelle*) as a populist party because it explicitly renounces any placement on the left-right spectrum and instead calls out "the corrupt elite." In Pakistan, we pull out Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf because it rose to power denouncing a corrupt traditional elite; we cannot place parties on the left-right spectrum there because it is anomalous for the national context.

C Information Treatment Effects

D Order Effects

We randomized the order of four blocks of questions in the survey. Some respondents received a survey with Order 1: vignettes - redistribution - corruption - trust whereas other received a survey with Order 2: trust - vignettes - redistribution - corruption. This allows us to study whether subjects express less trust in others if they are asked questions about corruption before being asked about trust.

Table A.1: Characteristics of citizen samples by country

	Colombia		Italy		Pakistan	
	Population (1)	Sample (2)	Population (3)	Sample (4)	Population (5)	Sample (6)
Gender						
Male	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.49
Age						
18-24 years old	0.24	0.24				
25-34 years old	0.23	0.23				
35-44 years old	0.19	0.17				
45-54 years old	0.16	0.16				
55-64 years old	0.12	0.12				
65-74 years old	0.07	0.07				
18-29 years old			0.16	0.16	0.37	0.29
30-39 years old			0.18	0.18	0.25	0.26
40-49 years old			0.23	0.23	0.18	0.22
50-59 years old			0.24	0.24	0.12	0.18
60-69 years old			0.19	0.19	0.07	0.04
Income						
Estrato 1	0.16	0.16				
Estrato 2	0.29	0.29				
Estrato 3	0.34	0.34				
Estrato 4	0.11	0.11				
Estrato 5	0.07	0.07				
Estrato 6	0.03	0.03				
€0- €17,999			0.27	0.27		
€18,000- €29,999			0.28	0.28		
€30,000- €39,999			0.19	0.19		
€40,000- €44,999			0.14	0.14		
€45,000+			0.12	0.12		
0 PKR - 29,000 PKR					0.40	0.36
30,000 PKR - 39,999 PKR					0.40	0.27
40,000 PKR - 49,999 PKR					NA	0.22
50,000+ PKR					NA	0.15
Macro-Regions						
Amazonia + Orinoquia	0.05	0.05				
Andino	0.41	0.40				
Bogota	0.17	0.17				
Costa Norte	0.19	0.20				
Pacifico	0.17	0.17				
Northwest			0.27	0.27		
Northeast			0.20	0.20		
Center			0.20	0.20		
South			0.23	0.23		
Islands			0.11	0.11		
Sample size		1,000		1,998		1,984

Table B.1: Factors related to whether respondents think corrupt vignette outcomes would and should occur

| | Colombia | | | Italy | | | Pakistan | | | All |
	Citizens (1)	Legislators (2)	Full Sample (3)	Citizens (4)	Legislators (5)	Full Sample (6)	Citizens (7)	Legislators (8)	Full Sample (9)	Countries (10)
Panel A: Corruption Expectation Index										
Male	-0.04	-0.20	-0.04	-0.12**	-0.08	-0.13***	-0.04	-0.09	-0.05	-0.07***
	(0.06)	(0.32)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Aged 35-49	-0.18**	-0.98**	-0.21**	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.11**	-0.19	0.08	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.35)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Aged 50 or more	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.14***	0.13	0.14**	-0.08	-0.15	-0.05	0.12***
	(0.08)	(0.35)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Medium income	-0.03		-0.03	0.08		0.08	0.11**		0.11**	0.06
	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.03)
High income	0.08		0.09	-0.06		-0.05	-0.04		-0.07	-0.04
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.04)
High School degree	0.03		0.04	0.23***		0.23***	-0.00		-0.02	0.11***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.04)
College degree	0.28***	-0.31	0.27***	0.20**	0.27	0.21***	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	0.16***
	(0.09)	(0.29)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Legislator			-0.65***			-0.53***			0.77***	0.07
			(0.21)			(0.11)			(0.09)	(0.05)
Pakistan										0.06
										(0.04)
Italy										-0.50***
										(0.04)
Rural							0.08			
							(0.05)			
Left-Wing Party	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.15***	-0.54**	0.11**				
	(0.08)	(0.64)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.06)				
5 Stars Movement				0.15***	0.47*	0.18***				
				(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.06)				
PTI							0.08	-0.03	0.08*	
							(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)	
Observations	985	30	1015	1976	112	2087	1942	291	2233	5399
R^2	0.034	0.359	0.043	0.023	0.199	0.038	0.015	0.003	0.057	0.071
Panel B: Corruption Tolerance Index										
Male	0.08	0.63	0.09	0.10**	0.51***	0.13***	0.02	0.19	0.03	0.08***
	(0.06)	(0.40)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Aged 35-49	-0.29***	-0.91	-0.31***	-0.22***	-0.35	-0.23***	0.02	-0.16	0.01	-0.10***
	(0.08)	(0.73)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Aged 50 or more	-0.41***	-1.06	-0.42***	-0.35***	-0.39	-0.35***	-0.17***	-0.26	-0.15***	-0.23***
	(0.08)	(0.82)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Medium income	-0.14		-0.13	-0.02		-0.02	-0.25***		-0.25***	-0.12***
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.03)
High income	-0.18*		-0.18*	0.15**		0.13*	0.01		0.01	0.01
	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.03)
High School degree	-0.06		-0.06	-0.09		-0.10	0.07		0.06	-0.04
	(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.04)
College degree	-0.17*	0.30	-0.16*	-0.08	0.43*	-0.07	-0.14**	-0.16	-0.16**	-0.15***
	(0.10)	(0.51)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Legislator			0.03			-0.19*			0.40***	0.20***
			(0.19)			(0.09)			(0.07)	(0.05)
Pakistan										0.94***
										(0.04)
Italy										0.26***
										(0.04)
Rural							0.02			
							(0.05)			
Left-Wing Party	-0.14*	0.42	-0.13	-0.19***	-0.59**	-0.20***				
	(0.08)	(0.49)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.06)				
5 Stars Movement				-0.12**	-0.64**	-0.15***				
				(0.06)	(0.27)	(0.06)				
PTI							0.16***	-0.02	0.14***	
							(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	
Observations	985	30	1015	1979	112	2090	1941	291	2232	5401
R^2	0.054	0.217	0.054	0.033	0.172	0.036	0.034	0.012	0.041	0.189

Notes: The dependent variable in every column of Panel A is the Corruption Expectation Index; the dependent variable in every column of Panel B is the Corruption Tolerance Index. Regressions reported in all panels include controls for gender, age group, income group, political affiliation, education, being a legislator, country fixed effects, and being from rural area. Omitted categories are being female, being younger than 35 years old, having a low income, not having completed high school, being a citizen respondent, being from Colombia, being from a urban area (for Pakistan citizens), voting/being from a right-wing party (for Colombia and Italy) or not voting/not being from PTI (for Pakistan). Standard errors in parentheses. *

Figure B.1: Shares of legislators reporting specific motivations for seeking public office

Notes: The figure depicts, by country, the share of respondents that report as important or very important every motivation for entering public office.

Table C.1: Treatment effects on belief that citizens overestimate corruption by country

	Colombia				Italy				Pakistan			
	Continuous (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)	Binary (4)	Continuous (5)	Binary (6)	Binary (7)	Binary (8)	Continuous (9)	Binary (10)	Binary (11)	Binary (12)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)												
Legislators mean	3.07	0.21	0.21	0.21	2.70	0.33	0.33	0.33	3.13	0.30	0.30	0.30
Above threshold mean			0.12				0.38				0.39	
Below threshold mean			0.33				0.22				0.20	
Panel B: Treatment Effects												
Treatment	-0.35	-0.08		-0.92	-0.12	-0.07		0.14	-0.23**	-0.11*		0.38
	(0.29)	(0.16)		(1.09)	(0.27)	(0.10)		(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.06)		(0.27)
T x More than 80% corruption as common			-0.02				-0.11				-0.19**	
			(0.22)				(0.12)				(0.08)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common			0.04				-0.01				-0.02	
			(0.24)				(0.17)				(0.08)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common				0.10				-0.03				-0.06*
				(0.13)				(0.05)				(0.03)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common				-0.04				0.05				0.07***
				(0.08)				(0.03)				(0.03)
Observations	24	24	24	24	97	97	97	97	219	219	219	219
R^2	0.504	0.181	0.195	0.218	0.075	0.021	0.041	0.045	0.087	0.049	0.069	0.087

Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (5), and (9) is a 5-point scale variable on the extent to which citizens under- or overestimate corruption, the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4), (6) to (8), and (10) to (12) is an indicator variable for whether legislators believe that citizens overestimate the extent of corruption. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, and education. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panels B reports the coefficients from four different specifications for Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan. For every country, the first and second column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The third column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The fourth column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.2: Treatment effects on belief that citizens and legislators hold similar views on corruption

	Continuous (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)	Binary (4)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)				
All Legislators mean	2.67	0.62	0.62	0.62
Above threshold mean			0.64	
Below threshold mean			0.58	
Panel B: All Legislators				
Treatment	-0.50***	-0.30***		-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.05)		(0.25)
T x More than 80% corruption as common			-0.38***	
			(0.06)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common			-0.16*	
			(0.09)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common				-0.04
				(0.03)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common				0.02
				(0.02)
Observations	340	340	340	340
R^2	0.130	0.111	0.122	0.115

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is a 4-point scale variable on whether politicians and voters hold similar views on corruption, the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4) is an indicator variable for whether legislators believe that citizens and legislators hold similar views on corruption. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, education, and country fixed effects. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panel B reports the coefficients from four different specifications. The first and second column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The third column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The fourth column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.3: Treatment effects on belief that citizens are concerned with corruption

	Continuous (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)	Binary (4)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)				
All Legislators mean	2.99	0.26	0.26	0.26
Above threshold mean			0.27	
Below threshold mean			0.24	
Panel B: All Legislators				
Treatment	0.11	0.08		-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.05)		(0.23)
T x More than 80% corruption as common			0.11*	
			(0.06)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common			0.00	
			(0.08)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common				0.02
				(0.03)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common				0.03
				(0.02)
Observations	339	339	339	339
R^2	0.220	0.073	0.082	0.091

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is a 5-point scale variable on whether voters see corruption as a major concern relative to other issues, the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4) is an indicator variable for whether legislators believe that citizens are more concerned with corruption than with other issues. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, education, and country fixed effects. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panel B reports the coefficients from four different specifications. The first and second column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The third column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The fourth column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.4: Treatment effects on belief that corruption undermines citizens' trust in government

	Continuous (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)	Binary (4)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)				
All Legislators mean	3.02	0.76	0.76	0.76
Above threshold mean			0.88	
Below threshold mean			0.59	
Panel B: All Legislators				
Treatment	-0.02	-0.00		0.46*
	(0.07)	(0.05)		(0.25)
T x More than 80% corruption as common			-0.09*	
			(0.05)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common			0.07	
			(0.09)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common				-0.06**
				(0.03)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common				0.08***
				(0.02)
Observations	339	339	339	339
R^2	0.087	0.024	0.085	0.082

Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is a 4-point scale variable on whether public perceptions of corruption undermines trust in government, the dependent variable in columns (2) to (4) is an indicator variable for whether legislators believe that public perceptions of corruption undermines a moderate amount or a lot trust in government. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, education, and country fixed effects. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panel B reports the coefficients from four different specifications. The first and second column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The third column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The fourth column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.5: Treatment effects on support for legislation

	Binary (1)	Binary (2)	Binary (3)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)			
All Legislators mean	0.90	0.90	0.90
Above threshold mean		0.87	
Below threshold mean		0.95	
Panel B: All Legislators			
Treatment	-0.08**		-0.17
	(0.04)		(0.19)
T x More than 80% corruption as common		-0.05	
		(0.05)	
T x Less than 80% corruption as common		-0.10*	
		(0.06)	
T x Second-order belief on corruption common			0.01
			(0.02)
Second Order Belief - Corruption Common			-0.01
			(0.01)
Observations	340	340	340
R^2	0.057	0.062	0.060

Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is an indicator variable for whether legislators are willing to support legislation aimed at strengthening financial disclosure laws All regressions include controls for gender, age group, education, and country fixed effects. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who were assigned to the control group (no information treatment) and separately for believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country. Panel B reports the coefficients from four different specifications. The first column shows the treatment effects of the information treatment. The second column shows the treatment effect on respondents believing that less or more than 80% of citizens believe that corruption is very common in their country separately. The third column shows the treatment effect interacted with the second order belief on how many people believe that corruption is very common. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Results are reported in Table D.1.

Table D.1: Effects on trust of thinking about corruption

	Citizens			Legislators		
	Most people would try to be fair (1)	Most people can be trusted (2)	Most politicians can be trusted (3)	Most people would try to be fair (4)	Most people can be trusted (5)	Most politicians can be trusted (6)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (control group only)						
Colombian mean	5.37	3.90	2.18	6.00	6.75	5.60
Italian mean	5.07	4.77	3.28	5.00	5.42	4.43
Pakistani mean	6.56	6.29	4.09	5.13	5.09	5.84
Panel B: Colombian Sample						
Corruption Salient	-0.85***	-0.04	0.38***	-1.13	-2.17**	-1.21
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.85)	(0.78)	(0.82)
Observations	993	986	961	29	30	29
R^2	0.051	0.042	0.016	0.370	0.369	0.254
Panel C: Italian Sample						
Corruption Salient	-0.44***	-0.36***	0.09	0.30	0.28	1.04**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.41)
Observations	1990	1987	1956	111	112	110
R^2	0.018	0.022	0.027	0.040	0.025	0.113
Panel D: Pakistani Sample						
Corruption Salient	0.11	0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.02	-0.34
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Observations	1984	1984	1984	291	291	291
R^2	0.146	0.091	0.053	0.010	0.009	0.018

Notes: All dependent variables are 11-point scale variables. Regressions reported in all panels for the citizen samples include controls for gender, age group, education, and income group. Regressions reported in all panels for the legislator samples include controls for gender, age group, and education. Panel A reports, by country, the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who answered the questions on trust before the questions on corruption. Panels B, C, and D show the effect of answering the questions on corruption first for Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Most of the time, there is no evidence of a statistically significant effect if subjects are asked to consider corruption prior to trust. But when there are significant effects, they are typically in the expected direction: being asked to think about corruption reduces trust in others.

E   Acknowledgements

F   Ethics Statement

The research reported in this paper was deemed exempt by the Institutional Review Board of Boston University, Protocol #6193X on September 22, 2021 and Protocol #6539X on June 1, 2022. The research did not involve deception. After each sample was collected (e.g. Italian voters, Italian legislators, Pakistani voters, Pakistani legislators), we randomly selected one subject as the lottery winner, informed that individual of his winning status, and made an anonymous donation on his behalf to the charity of his choice. If the individual had requested a framed certificate, we printed and delivered it to him.

G   Funding

H   Conflicts of Interest

There are no conflicts of interest on the part of any of the authors.

I   Data Availability

The data, code, and additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article will be made available at the Harvard Dataverse Network.

J   Preregistration and Pre-Analysis Plan

This project was preregistered with the AEA RCT Registry, AEARCTR-0008331, October 25, 2021. A Pre-Analysis Plan was filed on the EGAP Registry, ID 20211101AB, November 1, 2021.

K   Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

L   Survey Instrument

We reprint the survey instrument that we distributed to legislators. The information provided in Section 10 showed each legislator an accurate depiction of his specific responses to the vignette questions in relation to the average response by voters in his country. The citizen survey was identical except that we omitted Section 4 (Motivations for Entering Public Office) and Section 10 (Information Experiment with Legislators).

1. Introduction and informed consent

We are a non-partisan group of three academic researchers from Boston University and the European University Institute, conducting a study on the views of politicians and voters.

We are sending this survey to many politicians in Colombia/Pakistan/Italy and elsewhere. This survey will give you an opportunity to express your own views on important political questions. We are extremely interested in getting your perspective on these questions; by completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. Furthermore, if you complete the survey, you will have the option to receive a personalized report about how citizens and politicians in your country responded to it, and how their views compare to your own.

Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Results that are put in the public domain may include aggregate summary data, but under no circumstances will you ever be personally identified as a participant, nor will your answers ever be revealed without your express consent. The data will be used only for academic purposes and in no case for commercial or political purposes.

It is important for the success of our research that you fill out this survey personally and do not delegate answering to someone else. There are no right or wrong answers to any question. Please just answer as honestly as you can.

It is also important for the success of this research project that you complete the survey. The survey takes an average of about 10 minutes to complete.

If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at `legislator_survey@eui.eu`.

Consent Form Pop-Up

Do you agree to participate in this study?

Yes; *No*.

2. Survey introduction and set-up for the public goods game

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this survey!

We know you are very busy and we are grateful for your time.

If you complete the survey, your name will be entered in a lottery. If you win the lottery, [1,800,000 Colombian pesos/€1,000/20,000 PKR] will be donated in your name to a charity of your choice.

Your chances of winning depend on the total number of participants. If you are selected, you will be recontacted to let you know that you have won.

1. If you win the lottery, to which charity would you like your donation to be made?

   Italy: *Caritas*; *Save the Children Italia*; *Croce Rossa Italiana*.

   Pakistan: *Eidhi Foundation*; *Shaukat Khanum*; *Fatmid Foundation*

   Colombia: *Techo para mi país*; *Pies Descalzos*; *Acción contra el Hambre*.

3. Background questions

We want to ask some basic background questions to learn a bit more about you, and to ensure that the publicly-available information we have about you is accurate.

1. What is your gender?
   Male; *Female*; *Prefer not to say*.

2. What is your age?

3. What was your total household income, before taxes, last year?
   Same income brackets for Italy; Colombia; Pakistan as citizen surveys

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   Primary school; *High school*; *Vocational training*; *Bachelor's degree*; *Master's degree*; *Doctorate*.

5. *[If Bachelor's degree or more:]* Have you qualified as a lawyer?
   Yes; *No*.

6. In addition to serving as an elected politician, do you have other regular sources of income? [Multiple answers possible]
   None; *Landholdings*; *Business owner/self-employed*; *Full-time employment*; *Part-time employment*; *Consulting*.

We now would like to ask you a few questions about your activities and political background.

7. Which party were you affiliated with when you ran for the office you now hold?

    Colombia: *Pacto Histórico*; *Partido Liberal*; *Partido Conservador*; *Centro Democrático*; *Partido de la U*; *Cambio Radical*; *Alianza Verde*; *Other*.

    Italy: *Forza Italia*; *Lega*; *Fratelli d'Italia*; *Noi con l'Italia - UDC*; *Movimento 5 Stelle*; *Partito Democratico*; *+Europa*; *Liberi e Uguali*; *Altro*.

    Pakistan: *PTI*; *PML(N)*; *PPP*; *MMA*; *TLP*; *GDA*; *ANP*; *MQM-P*; *Other*.

8. How long have you been an elected politician (to any office)?

    Less than 2 years; *2 to 5 years*; *5 to 10 years*; *More than 10 years*.

9. Do you have any immediate relatives (e.g., parent, sibling, child) who serve or have served in elected public office?

    Yes; *No*.

10. Do you intend to seek reelection when your term of office ends?

    Yes; *No*; *Not sure*.

11. [If No or Not sure:] Do you intend to run for another public office instead, either immediately or in the future?

    Yes; *No*; *Not sure*.

12. Typically, how often do you access *news*? By news we mean national, international, regional/local news and other topical events accessed via any platform (radio, TV, newspaper or online).

    Several times a day; *Once a day*; *Several times a week*; *Once a week*; *Once a month*; *Never*.

13. How much do you believe religion should be taken into account in political decisions?

    Not at all; *To some extent*; *To a considerable extent*; *To a very large extent*; *Religious views should always take precedence*.

14. *[PAK]* How often do you pray?

    Five times daily; *Less than five times a day but every day*; *Less than every day*.

4. Motivations for entering politics

1. We have been talking to a lot of politicians like you and heard them describe many reasons for entering politics. What are the reasons you decided to become a politician? Please tell us how important each of these was in your thinking.

    - Career opportunities or pension after holding office.

    - To get the admiration of others.

    - To work on public policy and legislation.

    - The salary.

    - Less appealing opportunities in the private sector.

    - To help those in need or serve others in my community.

    Not important at all; *Slightly important*; *Important*; *Very important*.

2. Imagine you decide to resign your office tomorrow and seek other employment. How do you think the job you expect you would take would compare to your current office in terms of:

    - Salary

    - Work load

    - Job satisfaction

    A lot less; *Somewhat less*; *Same*; *Somewhat more*; *A lot more*.

5. Vignette questions

We understand that politicians face complex tradeoffs in making decisions. We'd like to hear what you think would be the appropriate decisions for public officials in the following hypothetical scenarios. We emphasize that there are no right or wrong answers – please tell us what you think would be the most appropriate response by the public official in each scenario.

1. An official in the national procurement office is in charge of overseeing a highway contract. Two companies have made comparable bids. **Company A** is known to be scrupulously honest. **Company B** is rumored to have bribed officials in the past to get contracts but is very efficient in its business. It is expected that Company B will complete the road much more quickly than Company A, without any sacrifice in quality.

    (a) Which company do you think the official **should** select?
    Company A; *Company B*.

    (b) Which company do you think the official **would** select if this were to occur in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?
    Company A; *Company B*.

2. A member of the [COL: Chamber of Representatives] [IT: Parliament] [PAK: National Assembly] discovers that his personal assistant was given a holiday gift of expensive chocolates [PAK: Eid sweets] by a businessman who had been trying to set up a meeting with the politician. After receiving the gift, the assistant set up a meeting for the following week, whereas it would normally have taken longer to make an appointment with the representative. Although not explicitly illegal, some people could see this as favoritism.

    (a) What do you think the legislator **should** do?
    Nothing; *Warn his assistant*; *Write up his assistant*; *Fire his assistant.*

    (b) What do you think the legislator **would** do if this were to occur in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?
    Nothing; *Warn his assistant*; *Write up his assistant*; *Fire his assistant.*

3. In a small town, a wealthy local businessman has announced that he intends to run for mayor. His main opponent lacks comparable financial resources but has received an offer from a supporter to pay for local television and radio advertising on his behalf. Imagine that this informal offer runs counter to campaign finance laws, but is unlikely to be uncovered by authorities, and without the additional funding the businessman's opponent has little chance of winning.

    (a) What do you think the opponent **should** do?

Accept the offer; *Decline the offer.*

    (b) What do you think the opponent is **likely** to do if this were to occur in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?

    Accept the offer; *Decline the offer.*

4. There is an opening for an accountant in the public works department of a small city. The short-list of candidates has been narrowed to two individuals. While both have appropriate qualifications and are legally eligible for the job, **Candidate A** has additional years of relevant work experience and is thus likely to transition into the position more smoothly; **Candidate B** is a relative of the head of the department, who has the ultimate decision on who gets the job.

    (a) Whom do you think the head of the department **should** hire?

    Candidate A; *Candidate B.*

    (b) Whom do you think the head of the department is **likely** to hire if this occurred in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?

    Candidate A; *Candidate B.*

5. A small town has recently elected a new, very wealthy businessman as its mayor. Prior to running for office, the businessman donated some of his personal wealth to help build a health facility in the city. Now evidence has emerged that before he entered politics, his company paid bribes to secure some of the government contracts.

    (a) Setting aside any concerns about party allegiance, how likely do you think it is that **you would vote** for this candidate if he ran for re-election?

    Never; *Very unlikely*; *Unlikely*; *Likely*; *Very likely*; *Certain.*

    (b) How likely do you think it is that this candidate **would be re-elected** if this occurred in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?

    Never; *Very unlikely*; *Unlikely*; *Likely*; *Very likely*; *Certain.*

6. Preferences for redistribution

We would like to get your views on income inequality and whether you think governments should play a role in reducing it.

1. Do you agree with the following statement?

   "Rich people should pay a larger share of their incomes in taxes than poor people."

   Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

2. The next two questions ask for your views about the role of government regarding two social issues. For each, a score of 1 means that the government should **not** concern itself with the issue and a score of 7 means the government should do **as much as possible** to resolve the issue.

   (a) **Unequal opportunity for children from rich and poor families.**

      On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means the government should not concern itself with creating opportunities to make children from poor and rich families less unequal and 7 means that the government should do everything in its power to reduce inequality of opportunity for children), which score comes closest to the way you feel?

      1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7

   (b) **Large income differences between rich and poor.**

      On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences between the rich and poor and 7 means that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income differences between rich and poor), which score comes closest to the way you feel?

      1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7

3. Do you agree with the following statement?

   National legislators should be permitted to earn money from outside employment while serving in office.

   Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

7. Corruption questions

1. (a) How common do you think corruption is in your country?

   Not common at all; *Not very common*; *Common*; *Extremely common*.

   (b) Out of 10 adult citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan], how many do you think would answer **common** or **extremely common**?

   Slider 0-10

2. (a) If a [COL: member of the Chamber of Representatives] [IT: deputy] [PAK: member of the National Assembly] were to take a bribe, what is the likelihood she or he would **be exposed in public**?

   Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

   (b) Out of 10 adult citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan], how many do you think would answer **likely**, **very likely**, or **certain**?

   Slider 0-10

3. (a) If a [COL: member of the Chamber of Representatives] [IT: deputy] [PAK: member of the National Assembly] were to take a bribe, what is the likelihood she or he would **be charged with a crime**?

   Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

   (b) Out of 10 adult citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan], how many do you think would answer **likely**, **very likely**, or **certain**?

   Slider 0-10

4. (a) If a [COL: member of the Chamber of Representatives] [IT: deputy] [PAK: member of the National Assembly] were to take a bribe, what is the likelihood she or he would **be convicted**?

   Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

   (b) Out of 10 adult citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan], how many do you think would an-

swer **likely**, **very likely**, or **certain**?

Slider 0-10

5. How likely do you think it is that the average member of the [COL: Chamber of Representatives] [IT: Parliament] [PAK: National Assembly] would be willing to accept a bribe?

Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

8. Trust questions

We would like to get your views on some aspects of social capital in Pakistan/Colombia/Italy.

1. Do you think that **most people** would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?

   Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below. The slider goes from 0 to 10, where 0 means *Most people would try to take advantage of me* and 10 means *Most people would try to be fair*.

2. Generally speaking, would you say that **most people** can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

   Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below. The slider goes from 0 to 10, where 0 means *You cannot be too careful in dealing with people* and 10 means *Most people can be trusted*.

3. Generally speaking, would you say that **most other politicians** can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?

   Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below. The slider goes from 0 to 10, where 0 means *You cannot be too careful in dealing with other politicians* and 10 means *Most other politicians can be trusted*.

9. Continuation of the public goods game

If you win the lottery and a donation of [1,800,000 Colombian pesos/€1,000/20,000 PKR] is made to the charity you chose, [*present charity of choice*], you may elect to receive a framed certificate acknowledging your donation. If you win, we will recontact you to inform you of that and to verify your address if you indicated you wish to receive the framed certificate.

Randomize:

- **No Waste:** The cost to produce and send you the certificate is [108,000 Colombian pesos/€60/1,200 PKR], to be covered by the researchers. The donation made in your name will therefore be [1,800,000 Colombian pesos/€1,000/20,000 PKR]. The certificate will report that you donated [1,800,000 Colombian pesos/€1,000/20,000 PKR].

- **Waste:** The cost to produce and send you the certificate is [108,000 Colombian pesos/€60/1,200 PKR], and this amount will be deducted from the donation made in your name. The donation made in your name will therefore be [1,692,000 Colombian pesos/€940/18,800 PKR]. The certificate will report that you donated [1,692,000 Colombian pesos/€940/18,800 PKR].

- **Waste + Lie:** The cost to produce and send you the certificate is [108,000 Colombian pesos/€60/1,200 PKR], and this amount will be deducted from the donation made in your name. The donation made in your name will therefore be [1,692,000 Colombian pesos/€940/18,800 PKR]. The certificate will report that you donated [1,800,000 Colombian pesos/€1,000/20,000 PKR].

Do you wish to receive the framed certificate if you win the lottery?

- *Yes, I would like to receive the certificate.*

- *No, I do not want to receive the certificate.*

10. Information experiment with legislators

    Randomize:

- **Control:** *No information about vignettes provided.*

- **Treatment:** The following figure compares the answers that you provided in response to the various scenarios that we presented to you a few minutes ago to those provided by a representative sample of adults in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]. The bars show the distribution of responses about what people expect politicians <u>would</u> do in each scenario and the little figure shows what you thought the official <u>should</u> do.

  As you can see, **in X scenarios out of 5**, a majority of voters think that public officials will make decisions that are different from what you believed to be appropriate.

  If you hover your cursor over the bar, the complete text of the scenario will pop up so you can reread it.

    Personalized treatment figure

1. Do you believe citizens and politicians share the same views on how public officials will behave in the five scenarios we presented earlier?
   Very similar; *Somewhat similar*; *Somewhat different*; *Very different*.

2. How concerned do you think citizens in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan] are with political corruption relative to other major policy issues, such as the economy, social unrest, or public health? *Much less concerned*; *Somewhat less concerned*; *About the same as other major concerns*; *Somewhat more concerned*; *Much more concerned*.

3. Do you think that voters' views about how serious corruption is in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan] are accurate?
   Voters underestimate its seriousness a lot; *Voters underestimate its seriousness a little*; *Voters have roughly accurate views* ; *Voters overestimate its seriousness a little*; *Voters overestimate its seriousness a lot*.

4. How much do you think that public perceptions of corruption undermine trust in government by voters in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?

   Not at all; *A little*; *A moderate amount*; *A lot*.

5. What policy or legislative reforms do you think could improve citizens' perceptions of corruption in [Colombia/Italy/Pakistan]?

   Like all your responses in this survey, your answer will remain confidential and we will report only anonymous information in our analysis.

   [Text entry box]

6. Would you be willing to support legislation that strengthens financial disclosure by persons running for elected office? Like all your responses in this survey, your answer will remain confidential and we will report only summary data in our analysis.

   Yes, I am willing to take this position; *No, I am not willing to take this position*

   Randomize assignment to Group 1 or 2:

7. **[If Group 1 or Group 2 and No to Q6:]** We would like to encourage you to claim credit in front of voters for your legislative accomplishments. Would you be willing to use a media platform of your choice to disseminate information about the most important piece of legislation you have supported recently? Use any language you choose.

   Yes, I am willing to remind voters of an important piece of legislation; *No, I am not willing to do this*

7.1 [If Yes:] I plan to send out an announcement via:

   Twitter; *Facebook*; *Instagram*; *My personal website*; *Other:*.

7.2 [If Yes:] The legislation I plan to discuss concerns (please provide subject matter):

   [Text entry box]

8. **[If Group 2 and Yes to Q6:]** We would like to encourage you to claim credit in front of voters for your legislative commitments. Would you be willing to make your support for legislation that strengthens financial disclosure by persons running for elected office public via social me-

dia? If you decline, your response will not be mentioned publicly and will remain confidential. If you wish to do this, please use the social media platform of your choice. Use any language you choose. One suggestion is the following: "In order to improve the integrity of government, I hereby announce that I support possible legislation to strengthen financial disclosures by candidates for elected office in Colombia/Italy/Pakistan."

Yes, I am willing to make this announcement; *No, I am not willing to make this announcement*

8.1 [If Yes:] I plan to send out an announcement via:

Twitter; *Facebook*; *Instagram*; *My personal website*; *Other:*.

11. Bias and Feedback

Thank you very much for having participated in this survey!

1. To thank you for having completed the survey, we will email you a personalized report that will allow you to compare your own responses to the questions that we have asked you to the responses given by citizens and by other politicians in your country. The report will be sent to you after we have finished collecting information in [Colombia/Pakistan/Italy].

   Do you wish to receive the report?
   Yes; *No*.

2. Do you feel that this survey was biased?
   [COL, IT:] *Yes, it was biased towards the left; Yes, it was biased towards the right; No, it did not feel biased.*
   [PAK:] *Yes, it was biased; No, it did not feel biased.*

3. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impressions regarding this survey. We may contact you in the future, and we are very interested in knowing whether there are aspects of this survey that you would have found more useful.
   [Text entry box]

4. [For respondents who received the information treatment only:] We are also interested in any comments you may have about the information we presented you about what citizens in your country think.

   [Text entry box]

If you wish to discuss any aspects of this survey with us, please email us at `legislator_survey@eui.eu` and we will respond as quickly as possible.